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ABSTRACT
In applications which use blockchains, Proof of Stake (PoS) chains have become an attrac-
tive alternative to more classical Proof of Work (PoW) chains due to their low transaction
latency and cheap hardware requirements. Correct implementations of both types of chains
provide security against the “double-spend” attack referenced in the original Bitcoin pro-
tocol. However, while PoW chains use cryptographic puzzle “mining” as a mechanism for
block extension, PoS chains must utilize alternate methods of proposing blocks. As a result,
when it is able to participate, an adversary targeting PoS chains can extend multiple blocks
without making sacrifices in the strength of its attack. This extension of multiple blocks
allows for the adversary to create forks of non-trivial length, which is not explored in PoW
analysis. Such forks allow for additional adversarial strategies, and alter the random walk
governing the security of the chain in ways that are difficult to monitor.
In this paper, we will present a pair of metrics designed to accurately track the advantage
gained by an adversary in a reasonable PoS setting. This pair of metrics, determined by
the hidden progress of the adversary against publicly released chains, directly map to the
adversary’s ability to remove committed blocks from the chain, and behave naturally in a
walk detailing the lifetime of a chain. We offer these metrics for the simplification of further
analysis of PoS chains and applications. Finally, we confirm previous results regarding the
security of PoS chains. Through an analysis of our metric, we show that, like PoW chains,
PoS chains are secure against double-spend attacks except for probability which decays
exponentially with respect to chain length.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In the past decade since Nakamoto’s Bitcoin white paper [1], many of its advances have
seen rapid development and adoption into real-world systems. In particular, with the rise
of cryptocurrencies, we have seen ideas such as anonymous payments powered by the dis-
tributed ledger reach the mainstream, with coins such as Ethereum and Bitcoin becoming
realistically usable in more transactions as they become more popular.
These implementations have gained a lot of popularity for the features they provide.
Through the security guarantees of the blockchain, users can be assured that their purchases
and transactions are irreversible, and they can do this without the need for approval from
a central authority, like a bank or credit lender. Furthermore, cryptocurrencies can protect
a user’s privacy by removing the need to additionally tie funds to a real-world identity.
Of course, these features come at significant cost as well. In order to provide these security
guarantees, a single transaction must ensure that it will remain on the blockchain indefinitely.
That is, transactions encoded into a block must allow the chain to be built for a number
of blocks beyond itself in order for the transaction to be confirmed. While PoW coins have
been adopted to an extent such that a surplus of block extensions allow transactions to run
smoothly, the infamous energy consumption needed to support blockchain transactions have
made even further expansion somewhat problematic. At present, just the upkeep of Bitcoin
alone consumes around 120 terawatt-hours of electricity per year [2], a quantity rivaling
medium-sized countries.
Many of these drawbacks stem from the cryptographic implementation of block extension
in Proof of Work (PoW) chains. The verification of proposed blocks in PoW systems requires
that participants solve difficult computation puzzles, commonly known as “mining”, and
this serves as a bottleneck for CPU usage and energy consumption. The most popular
alternative to circumvent this bottleneck is to instead track the amount of currency owned
by each user involved with the chain, and distribute block extension privileges proportional
to this amount. Users that own significant amounts of currency are thought to be those
most interested in the continued health of the chain, and so are given greater power and
responsibility in the chain’s upkeep. Implementations of this style of chain, called Proof of
Stake (PoS), successfully remove the computation mining bottleneck, but open themselves
up to some potential new adversarial strategies. In particular, as they no longer need to
devote significant resources for proposing blocks, a malicious actor attempting to create a
long alternative chain in order to depose committed blocks can hide any number of viable
extended blocks, so long as their extensions otherwise satisfy mining rules. While PoS has
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been proven to still provide meaningful security even with these new attacks, existing proofs
complicate some parts of analysis through abstracting security metrics outside of the chain
itself [3]. We hope to create a new metric which is capable of a more concrete analysis given a
snapshot of the chain. That is, while it must still accurately describe the probability that an
adversary is capable of creating a successful attack, it should additionally provide a simple
description of security at a specific time, regardless of the adversarial strategy used. The
former should allow us to reconfirm results from previous PoS papers, namely the widely
used Ouroboros proofs from Kiayias et al. [3], and the latter should allow us to clearly show
the relation between adversarial actions and security of the chain.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
As PoS chains have the potential to greatly reduce energy costs in any applications which
currently use PoW chains, there is quite a large body of work on the topic. In this section,
we will outline a few papers most closely aligned with this work, as well as explain how our
novel work in Chapter 4 accompanies existing PoS discussion.
Ouroboros Proof of Stake and Extensions A central work in this paper’s analysis of
PoS chains is the Ouroboros protocol, first suggested in 2017 by Kiayias et al. [3]. This
paper provides a novel analysis of the security of PoS chains, and is often cited as the
first to provide an adequate proof which provides suitable guarantees against double-spend
attacks, as they were originally introduced in the Nakamoto paper [1]. A parallel to our own
analysis is their proof and subsequent random walk regarding the likelihood of alternate
chains described in the 2017 paper. As in our paper, Ouroboros discusses the additional
capabilities of a PoS adversary over a PoW adversary in the form of their ability to create
forks of non-trivial length. This idea is crucial to the analysis of PoS security, and is shared
between our works. However, in Ouroboros, the analysis of these forks is remedied by an
abstraction to honest and adversarial timeslots. Abstracting in this way allows Ouroboros
to set an upper limit on adversarial activity, but loses some subtleties in that it does not
directly provide values for the security of the actual chains built and revealed during those
times. While we will also be utilizing an idealized timeslot abstraction for our analysis,
we will attempt to recover a notion of security for a pre-built chain through our newly
proposed metric. It is of course important to note that Ouroboros is an ongoing project,
with Ouroboros Praos [4] and Ouroboros Genesis [5] providing an updated analysis over the
original paper. However, the contributions of these newer papers primarily focus on the
implementation of the leader selection for a selected timeslot. While such ideas are very
important for the real-world application of PoS chains, they will be somewhat orthogonal
to our analysis, which abstracts these details to focus purely on the security of a very basic
Proof of Stake chain.
Other Related Protocols Other protocol papers important to PoS viability include the
Snow White protocol, proposed by Daian et al. in a 2016 paper [6], and the Algorand paper
and subsequent implementation from Gilad et al. in 2016 [7]. Of course, both of these papers
provide reasonable support for similar applications, and the Byzantine Agreement consensus
of Algorand is already in use, but as our intended protocol and metric differ significantly
from either, we believe there is plenty of room for our work to go along with these popular
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PoS implementations as well.
Relevant Proof of Stake Extensions We will additionally mention a few proof of stake
extensions which are of relevance when discussing PoS security.
Notably, the value of ideas such as sidechains have already been made apparent in Proof
of Work settings, and similar works for Proof of Stake [8] are important in fully integrating
PoS protocols into existing PoW implementations. Also relevant to discussion are economic
models of PoS protocols [9] where the mining requirement and reward philosophy of PoW
is no longer applicable. Finally, research work into differences in the attack model of PoS
chains, such as the quite extensively discussed “nothing-at-stake” attack [10][11][12] are of
significant importance when discussing security.
Related Statistical Concepts While not directly related to Proof of Stake or blockchains
in general, we will also note that this work will extensively use in its proofs of security a
2D random walk. While we had originally hoped to follow suit with Ouroboros and Bitcoin
in the usage of a Markov chain random walk towards a simple probability analysis [13], we
were unable to exactly recreate the idea in a second dimension. However, the random walk
will still be governed by similar concepts.
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND
In this section, we will provide descriptions of some common concepts which will frame
the rest of our work.
Blocks, Chains, and Transactions A transaction is a small amount of data, usually
representing a monetary exchange between two users of the system. Multiple transactions
can be encoded into a single block. Blocks may have at most one other block as a parent,
where the parent must be some block which existed before the child was created. A set of
blocks whose parents are also contained within the set are referred to as a chain.
Longest Chain Blockchains Blockchain protocols successively propose and attach blocks
together such that each block must have a parent that is also within the system, creating a
chain in the process. Longest Chain protocols are a subset of blockchain protocols in which
honest players are expected to build directly upon the chain which has the largest number of
blocks that they are aware of. These protocols rely on the assumption that it is very difficult
for an adversary or group of adversaries to develop a long chain of their own that would
contradict the existing history created by the honest participants of the protocol. Usually,
this assumption is satisfied through some restrictions into who can propose a block to add
to the chain, and when they are able to do so.
Transactions in a Blockchain The full history of the longest chain serves as a ledger
which dictates which transactions are present in the system. Blockchain histories are said
to be distributed, since each player has their own copy of the history of the chain, which is
updated through their interactions with the blockchain. Transactions are all signed through
the usage of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), such that it is exceedingly difficult to forge
transactions, and attacks within a single block are not viable.
Committed Blocks and Commit Length Due to the distributed nature of the ledger,
a user cannot assume that every block currently on the longest chain will remain on the
longest chain indefinitely. Even if blocks are on the longest chain in the local view, this
may change if an updated version of the ledger would contradict this. As a result, most
blockchain implementations only finalize transactions after a number of blocks, known as
the commit length, have extended past the block containing the transaction. After this
point, it is unlikely for the transaction to be absent from the longest chain. Blocks buried
under this number of blocks are considered permanent fixtures of the longest chain. In
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blockchains where transactions include an exchange of currency, the currency is thought to
have transferred ownership at this point.
Double Spend Attacks The primary security concern for longest-chain blockchains is
the double spend attack. A double spend attack is characterized by the following steps.
A block on the chain is committed normally, by being extended a number of times that
exceeds the commit length. The adversary then creates an alternate chain which does not
contain the originally committed block. When this alternate chain matches the length of
the longest chain currently being used by honest parties, the attack is successful. Since the
chain created by the adversary is a viable alternative as a longest chain, transactions in the
committed block may no longer be permanent fixtures of the ledger. If these transactions
involved a purchase of some sort, the currency would be made available again for the buyer,
hence “double spend”.
Proof of Work Proof of Work Longest Chain protocols are the current standard for
implementations of blockchain applications. They are characterized by requiring that users
solve difficult computation problems (commonly finding a value to add to blocks such that
their SHA-256 hash is less than some target) in order to propose valid blocks. Solving these
cryptographic puzzles is a practice typically referred to as mining. Proof of Work as a term
refers to the idea that a user proposing blocks in the system is proving their identity through
the CPU cost they devoted in the proposal of the block.
Security under Honest Majority In the simplest case, without delays, Proof of Work
chains have been shown to be secure under a simple majority of honest users [1]. This figure
stems from the fact that even if honest parties have only a small advantage (i.e. control 51%
of CPU power in PoW), it will be very difficult for the minority parties to create an alternate
chain which can match the longest chain for a time long enough to execute an attack, even
if all of the minority parties work together. This security under simple majority extends to
Proof of Stake chains as well [3], provided the same network conditions with no delays.
Proof of Stake Proof of Stake Longest Chain protocols are an alternative to Proof of
Work blockchains suggested as a means to counteract the latter’s quickly increasing energy
costs [13] and potential for breaking decentralization [14]. While there are minor differences
in interpretations of Proof of Stake, PoS protocols are characterized by somehow weighting
the chance at block proposal privileges through individual users’ involvement in the protocol,
or their “stake”. This stake must have some inherent value such that it is cost-prohibitive
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to acquire a large amount of it towards malicious goals. Proof of Stake is most naturally
applicable to cryptocurrencies in which stake can be measured by the amount of currency
associated with the relevant stake-holder.
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CHAPTER 4: PROTOCOL AND METRIC DEFINITIONS
In this section, we will provide a novel metric for describing the security of PoS chains, as
well as a basic PoS protocol definition which we will analyze using this metric. It should be
noted that in order to focus on the metric itself, we provide a purposefully simple protocol,
abstracting many implementation details. Below is a list of assumptions we will be making
towards this simple case, as well as a few definitions we will use in the description of our
protocol and metric.
4.1 ASSUMPTIONS
Parties and Public Key Infrastructure There exist a fixed number of participants in
the protocol, and each party has a public/private key pair for a digital signature scheme.
A public-key infrastructure (PKI) exists to certify all parties’ public keys. Each party can
either be entirely honest, in which case it must follow all guidelines dictated by the protocol,
or it is otherwise adversarial. Parties which are part of the adversary can be considered
Byzantine, and may act arbitrarily.
Synchrony and Timeslots Due to blockchains being deployed across some network, it
is assumed that there is some delay between messages being sent by participating parties.
A synchronous environment in this context assumes that there is some fixed upper bound
for message delay. We will define a timeslot, or round, to be the period of time necessary
to account for this message delay. That is, any messages sent during the round are assumed
to have reached their intended target before the next round has been set to begin. We will
additionally assign each round a sequential index starting from 0, such that we can refer to
a round in the protocol by number.
Fixed-Stake We assume that stake is assigned before the protocol starts, and that every
party has an equal amount of stake such that each party has an equal chance of participating
in block extension. This stake will not be exchanged during the runtime of the protocol.
4.2 BLOCKCHAIN-SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS
Leader of a round A single party will be chosen by an ideal leader election oracle to
lead each numbered round. We will refer to this party as the leader of the round. We will
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additionally define the notation Lt to describe the leader of round t. If the leader is honest,
Lt = H, and if it is part of the adversary, Lt = A.
Block Definition A single block will consist of information regarding the round number
in which it was created, and a unique parent block, i.e., bi = (ri, bi−k). A block bi must be
signed by the leader of round i, and its parent must be from a round prior to i, such that
k is positive. Blocks not following this pattern are ignored. A blockchain is a sequence of
blocks C = (b0, b1, b2, ..., bm). Following conventions, block bi in a chain has height i; The
length of the blockchain C is |C| = m, i.e., the number of blocks who have parents in the
blockchain, excluding the first block built.
Genesis Block The genesis block is a block that has no parent. It consists of information
regarding the round number in which it was created, and an identifier which is unique from
any other genesis block, i.e., gi = (ri,m). Genesis blocks are subject to being signed by the
leader that proposed them like any other block. Any non-empty chain in the protocol must
have exactly one genesis block, and the genesis block will be used as an identifier for the
chain. In the “Genesis Case” of our protocol, we assume that the genesis block’s identifier
is the only data vulnerable to a double-spend attack.
4.3 ADDITIONAL NOTATION
Views and Public Chains Messages sent between parties contain entire blockchains, and
a party is expected to retain the knowledge of any chains which have been sent to them for
the lifetime of the protocol.
We will define the set of blocks known to a party at time t as its view at t. Each view is
instantiated as the empty set, and is strictly increasing, as any blocks which come into the
view will remain there for the duration of the protocol.
A full chain C is in party p’s view at time t if every block in C is in party p’s view at time
t. A chain C is public at time t if C is in every honest party’s view. Similarly, a chain C is
hidden if at time t it C is not in any honest party’s view. We will additionally provide some
notation to refer to a few special subsets of views.
Let P(t) be the set of public chains at time t. Let P∗(t) be the set of longest public chains,
i.e., chains with the maximum length in P(t). Let G(t) be the set of all chains at time t
(regardless of whether honest parties know about them).
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Subtrees and Convergence Due to the nature of our analysis, it will become necessary
to identify chains which have equivalent histories until a certain height of interest. Towards
an easier description of this phenomenon, we will define a subtree notation. For height h,
we arbitrarily assign to each unique block at h a different numerical value. Each block then
expresses a unique subtree rooted at height h. Each chain with length at least h belongs to
one of these subtrees, determined by its block at height h. We say two chains C and C ′ are
convergent, denoted by C ≈h C ′, if they share the same subtree root at height h. Similarly,
they are divergent, denoted by C 6≈h C ′, if they lie on different subtrees. Chains which do
not reach height h do not lie on a subtree of h, and are therefore divergent from all chains
at height h, including other chains shorter than length h. For simplicity of analysis, we will
first only consider trees rooted at height 0, as part of our “Genesis Case”. That is, in future
discussion, unless otherwise stated, we will take the notation C ≈ C ′ to mean convergent at
height 0, and similarly, Ci will indicate that chain C lies on tree i for height 0.
We will also define some quantities with respect to trees for the previously defined subsets
of views. Let pi(t) refer to the maximum length of any chain in P∗(t) which is also on the
tree i. Let gi(t) refer to the maximum length of any chain in G(t) present in the tree i.
Additionally, set I(t) is the set of trees i such that there exists a chain Ci ∈ P∗(t). J(t)
is the full set of available trees at time t.
4.4 PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
There are n parties (stakeholders). There is an honest majority within the protocol, such
that less than n/2 parties are Byzantine and can deviate from the protocol arbitrarily. The
remaining parties are honest, and faithfully follow the protocol. The protocol proceeds in
rounds. In each round, a leader is selected, and all parties immediately learn its identity.
Actions of an Honest Party In a single round, an honest party must perform the
following: If it is selected as a leader, it must create and sign a block extending the longest
blockchain in its view (with ties being selected by adversary choice). It must then send a
message containing this new block before the end of the round. All other parties will add this
new block to their view at the end of this round. If a leader intentionally performs actions
outside of these requirements, or is unable to meet these requirements, it is considered to
be part of the adversary (who must still make up less than n/2 stakeholders). If an honest
party is not selected as a leader, it still has an obligation to forward any newly received
blocks to all other parties should that chain be longer than any others in the party’s view.
This will be reflected at the latest at the start of the next round.
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Adversary Details We will attempt to define an adversary that has a significant amount
of control in order to show the overall robustness of PoS chains. However, it should be noted,
due to our fully synchronous setting, the adversary does not have a significant amount of
control over network traffic. The adversary is as follows: All malicious parties are controlled
and coordinated by a single adversary. A malicious leader can create as many blocks and at
any places it desires. These blocks can only be signed with private keys which are part of
the adversary, and so must be created during rounds led by the adversary.
The adversary has no obligation to send messages, and can send messages freely. As a
result, the adversary can withhold blocks and reveal them later in any round to any subset
of honest parties. But note that if a block revealed to some honest party in a round becomes
a part of that honest party’s longest chain, the block will be forwarded to by that honest
party to all other honest parties in the next round.
Additional Protocol Details Since the adversary can freely make blocks known to a
subset of honest parties, it cannot be assumed that P(t) will reflect every chain known to
honest leaders after round t. However, as honest parties forward their longest chain at the
end of the round, P∗(t) will contain every longest chain known to honest parties at the end of
round t. As a result, if the adversary has control of a chain which is as long as some longest
chain in the protocol at the end of round t and Lt+1 = H, the adversary is able to choose
whether this chain is extended in round t + 1, or whether the original chain continues to be
extended. Additionally, the set G(t) represents the adversary’s view at the beginning of any
round t. This is because the adversary has perfect knowledge of any chains created during
the lifetime of the system, as honest parties share created blocks freely, and the adversary
works as a single entity.
4.5 METRIC DEFINITION
In this section, we will propose a new paradigm for the description of PoS chains, the
primary novel contribution of this work. In comparison to existing metrics, we prioritized the
ability to dictate security on a specific state of the chain, which we believed to prove difficult
for prior works. The following metric allows for this clear description for any adversarial
strategy, while maintaining bounds very similar to prior work. In particular, the random
walk in Chapter 6 should closely reflect its counterparts in contemporary papers.
At a given time t, for a longest public chain C ∈ P∗(t), we will make use of the three
quantities pi(t), gi(t), and gj(t), where i 6= j. It’s important to note that since there can be
multiple chains in P∗(t), multiple i can be valid for time t.
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The main metrics we will use in our analysis will simply be the minimum differences




Y (t) = min
i∈I(t)
pi(t)− gi(t) (4.2)
It may be useful to consider X(t) as the direct advantage honest parties have over the
adversary, whereas Y (t) is representative of the potential advantage the adversary can gain
should it acquire the ability to manipulate honest actions (i.e. when X(t) ≤ 0). We will
show that these two quantities nicely capture the status quo of the consensus protocol.
A few initial observations:
It is useful to observe that if X(t) ≥ 1, then all chains in P∗(t) are convergent with each
other and there exists no longer chain that is divergent from them. This follows from the
release of any longest chains by honest blocks before the start of the round. If X(t) ≥ 1,
then some honest party knew about a chain longer than any in G(t− 1) by the end of round
t− 1, which must have been released to all honest parties prior to round t. This also means
that if X(t) ≥ 1, all honest nodes have concurrent histories at the height of interest. In our
height-0 case, it means they all agree on a genesis block.
On the other hand, if X(t) is zero or negative, then P∗(t) may contain multiple values,
and honest parties may disagree on the height of interest. This can be seen if an adversary
simply releases a chain of length equal to the longest chain in round t − 1. Honest parties
will immediately know about two different longest chains which will be indistinguishable to
them. Therefore, they will be forced to choose between them in some way, a tie which we
allow the adversary to decide on.
It is also important to note that Y (t) cannot exceed 0, as G(t) is a superset containing
P(t).
We will show that the safety of the protocol essentially comes down to a race over X(t):
honest nodes collectively increase X(t) faster than an adversary can decrease it. The role of
Y (t) may not be immediately obvious but its importance will be more clear in the proofs.
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CHAPTER 5: THE METRIC AS A FUNCTION OF ROUNDS
In this section, we will analyze how the metrics X(t) and Y (t) change during the execution
of the protocol. To elaborate, we will establish recurrence lower bounds for X(t + 1) and
Y (t + 1) as functions of the previous round’s X(t) and Y (t).
5.1 SUBTREES OF NOTE IN ROUND T
We will first point out some simple facts that will remain true throughout the runtime
of the protocol. Recall the definitions of X(t), Y (t), X(t + 1), and Y (t + 1). Suppose the
minimum values in the definitions of X(t), Y (t), X(t + 1), and Y (t + 1) are reached by
honest parties on trees u, v ∈ I(t) and u′, v′ ∈ I(t + 1), respectively. Additionally, there will
exist some trees which contain a longest chain in G(t) and G(t + 1) divergent to u and u′.
We will name these trees k and k′ respectively. This results in the following quantities:
X(t) = min
i∈I(t),j∈J(t),i 6=j
(pi(t)− gj(t))) = pu(t)− gk(t), (5.1)
Y (t) = min
i∈I(t)
(pi(t)− gi(t)) = pv(t)− gv(t), (5.2)
X(t + 1) = min
i∈I(t+1),j∈J(t+1),i 6=j
(pi(t + 1)− gj(t + 1))) = pu′(t + 1)− gk′(t + 1), (5.3)
Y (t + 1) = min
i∈I(t+1)
(pi(t + 1)− gi(t + 1)) = pv′(t + 1)− gv′(t + 1). (5.4)
We remark that u, v, u′, v′, k, and k′ may not be unique.
Clearly, pu(t) = pv(t) ≤ pu(t + 1) = pv(t + 1). Simply recall that I(t) contains only trees
represented in the set of longest public chains P∗(t). Thus, all subtrees in I(t) (resp. I(t+1))
have public chains of equal length. Further note that the length of the longest public chains
will not decrease over time.
We can make some additional remarks regarding changes in the chain with respect to
honest chain extension and release. If round t has an honest leader, suppose the honest
leader extends a chain W ∈ G(t) on subtree w to obtain a new chain W ′ ∈ G(t + 1). The
following facts are clear:
G(t + 1) = G(t) ∪ {W ′}, (5.5)
W ′ ≈ W, (5.6)
|W ′| = |W |+ 1. (5.7)
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To see these, simply note that W ′ is the only newly created chain in an honest round and
W ′ extends W by one. Our previous observations will then follow from the calculation of
pw(t) and pw(t + 1).
The following lemmas regarding u, v, u′, v′, k, k′,W , and W ′ are also not hard to see.
Lemma 5.1. If the leader of round t is honest, then pu′(t) = pv′(t + 1) ≥ pw(t + 1) =
pw(t) + 1 ≥ pu(t) + 1 = pv(t) + 1.
Proof. Since an honest leader extends a longest chain in its view, W must be as least as
long as any chain in P∗(t), i.e., |W | ≥ pu(t) = pv(t). The honest leader will send W ′ to all
parties after mining it, so W ′ ∈ P(t + 1). Thus, any chain in P∗(t + 1) (which is defined to
be the longest among P(t+ 1)) must be at least as long as W ′, i.e., pu′(t+ 1) = pv′(t+ 1) ≥
|W ′|. QED.
Lemma 5.2. If the leader of round t is honest and X(t) ≥ 1, then u = w = u′ = v′ = v.
Proof. When X(t) ≥ 1, for any chain C ′ on subtree 6= u, |C ′| ≤ pu(t) − 1 (otherwise
X(t) ≤ 0). In other words, any chain C ′ ∈ G(t) that diverges from u must be shorter than
pu(t). This implies w = u because W ∈ G(()t) and is at least as long as pu(t). Thus, w = u
since W is extended on subtree w. This also implies u′ = u = w. Similarly, v′ = v = w.
Thus, the four relevant u, v, u′, and v′ come from the same subtree in this case. QED.
5.2 RECURRENCE BOUNDS WITH RESPECT TO THE PREVIOUS ROUND
The recurrence bounds will then fall into four different cases. Clearly, the values of X(t+1)
and Y (t + 1) will react in different ways for cases in which the leader of round t is honest
and cases in which it is adversarial. We will also show that due to lemma 5.2, the recurrence
will also be different for cases X(t) > 0 and X(t) ≤ 0. The permutations of these two pairs
result in our four separate cases.
Theorem 5.1. If Lt = H and X(t) ≥ 1, then X(t + 1) ≥ X(t) + 1 and Y (t + 1) ≥
min(0, Y (t) + 1).
Proof. Recall that the honest leader extends W ∈ G(t) on subtree w to obtain W ′ ∈ G(t+1).
By Lemma 5.2, w = u = u′. Recall that G(t + 1) = G(t) ∪ {W ′}. As such, for any subtree
j 6= u, gj(t) = gj(t + 1). Since we also have pu′(t + 1) ≥ pu(t) + 1 by Lemma 5.1, the
recurrence bound on X is proved.
By Lemma 5.1 and 5.2, we have pv′(t + 1) ≥ |W ′| = |W |+ 1 ≥ pv(t) + 1 and v = w = v′.














Figure 5.1: If an honest leader is selected while X > 0, honest advantage will increase on
the same tree.
v at time t with the singular addition of chain W ′. Suppose Y (t) = pv(t)− gv(t) = −d ≤ 0
(recall that Y (t) cannot be positive). Since W is on subtree v, |W | ≤ gv(t) = pv(t) + d, and
hence |W ′| ≤ pv(t) + d + 1.
Now there are two cases. If |W ′| ≤ pv(t) + d, then gv′(t + 1) = pv(t) + d and
Y (t + 1) = pv′(t + 1)− gv′(t + 1) = pv′(t + 1)− pv(t)− d ≥ 1− d = 1 + Y (t).
If |W ′| = pv(t) + d + 1 instead, then gv′(t + 1) = |W ′| and Y (t + 1) = pv′(t + 1)− |W ′| ≥ 0.
Combining the two cases proves the recurrence bound Y (t + 1) ≥ min(0, Y (t) + 1). QED.
This case is very familiar to longest-chain security. As the longest chain built by honest
parties grows, it becomes decreasingly likely that the adversary will be able to build a













Figure 5.2: If an adversarial leader is selected while X > 0, they can decrease honest
advantage, but may not release chains into P∗(t).
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Theorem 5.2. If Lt = A, and X(t) ≥ 2, then X(t+ 1) ≥ X(t)− 1 and Y (t+ 1) ≥ Y (t)− 1.
Proof. When X(t) ≥ 2, all chains in P∗(t) are on a single tree u, and any chain in G(t) not
on tree u must be shorter by at least two. As a result, any chain in G(t + 1) that diverges
from P∗(t) must be shorter by at least one. More formally, we have:
∀j ∈ J(t), gj(t) ≤ pu(t)− 2,
∀j′ ∈ J(t + 1), gj′(t + 1) ≤ pu(t)− 1.
Because this is the case, there is no competing tree which has a chain that matches the
length of pu(t), even in round t+ 1. As chains in P∗(t+ 1) must be at least as long as chains
in P∗(t), this means all chains in P∗(t + 1) are also on tree u.
As a result, it must be true that k′ 6= u. Since this is the case, gk′(t+ 1) can increase to at
most one more than any chain divergent from u in round t, the longest of these being length
gk(t).
This means gk(t + 1) ≤ gk(t) + 1. As a result, we have X(t + 1) ≥ X(t)− 1.
The recurrence bound Y (t+1) ≥ Y (t)−1 can be proved similarly: observe that as u′ = u,
by chain extension gu′(t + 1) ≤ gu(t) + 1, and pu(t + 1) ≥ pu(t) QED.
This case also closely matches the ideas behind longest-chain security. While there exists
a suitably long chain in the public view, the adversary has no power over honest block
extension, and their only available strategy is to hope to catch up to the longest chain














W is revealed 
before (t+1)
Figure 5.3: An honest leader will still increase overall advantage even if X ≤ 0. However,
as the honest subtree is uncertain, the values of X and Y are interchangeable.
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Theorem 5.3. If Lt = H, then X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1) and Y (t + 1) ≥
min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1, 0).
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, pu′(t+ 1) = pv′(t+ 1) ≥ |W ′| = |W |+ 1 ≥ pu(t) + 1 = pv(t) + 1. Also
note that G(t + 1) = G(t) ∪ {W ′}.
Thus, for u-divergent and u′-divergent trees k and k′ which cause X(t) and X(t + 1) to
take on their values, gk′(t + 1) ≤ max(gk(t), |W ′|). Consider two cases below.
Case 1. If gk′(t + 1) > |W ′|, we have gk′(t + 1) = gk(t). Therefore,
X(t + 1) = pu′(t + 1)− gk′(t + 1)
≥ min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1).
Where the second equation follows from lemma 5.1. Similarly, Y (t + 1) ≥ min(X(t) +
1, Y (t) + 1)
Case 2. If gk′(t + 1) = |W ′|, it means W ′ was longer than all the chains in G(t). Since
the honest leader sends W ′ to all parties, W ′ will be the only element in P∗(t + 1) where
(w = u′ = v′). This immediately implies Y (t + 1) = 0. It also implies that gj(t + 1) = gj(t)
and therefore
X(t + 1) = pw(t + 1)− gj(t + 1)
= min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1).
We proved that X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1) in both cases, thus establishing its
recurrence bound in the theorem statement. On the other hand, Y (t + 1) has the same
bound in one case but is zero in the other case, and taking the minimum of both results
in the corresponding recurrence bound Y (t + 1) ≥ min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1, 0) (which is as
expected since Y (t + 1) must be non-positive). QED.
The negative cases mark a departure from the longest-chain security present in Proof of
Work. Since the adversary is able to extend multiple blocks, the hidden chain represented
by Y (t) can be used once a suitable alternate longest chain is created. It should now be clear
why this Y (t) value marks the potential harm an adversary can do, as it can immediately
gain Y (t) advantage over the honest parties should X(t) reach zero.
Theorem 5.4. If Lt = A, then X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t) − 1, Y (t) − 1) and Y (t + 1) ≥














W is revealed 
before (t+1)
Figure 5.4: If X(t) ≤ 0, an adversarial leader may reveal subtrees of equal length to the
honest subtree in order to update X to match the Y quantity.
Proof. By chain extension, gk′(t+ 1) ≤ gk(t) + 1. Also note that pu′(t+ 1) ≥ pu(t), as chains
in P∗(t + 1) must be at least as long as chains in P∗(t). Therefore,
X(t + 1) = pu′(t + 1)− gk′(t + 1) ≥
= pu(t)− gk(t)− 1
= min(X(t), Y (t))− 1
The recurrence bound Y (t + 1) ≥ min(X(t), Y (t)) − 1 can be proved similarly. By chain
extension, gv′(t + 1) ≤ gk(t) + 1, with pv′(t + 1) ≥ pv(t) as previous. Therefore,
Y (t + 1) = pv′(t + 1)− gv′(t + 1) ≥
= pv(t)− gk(t)− 1
= min(X(t), Y (t))− 1
QED.
An adversarial leader if X(t) is non-positive continues as one would expect. In the worst
case, if there is a hidden chain extending past the tree which is currently being used by
honest parties, the adversary can induce the honest parties to swap to a different chain,
gaining the hidden chain’s length in advantage. Otherwise, the adversary can, at worst,
continue to extend the hidden chains which it may be able to use in the future.
Note that while Theorem 5.3 and 5.4 hold for all values of X(t), they are only relevant
when X(t) is small (≤ 0 for Theorem 5.3 and ≤ 1 for Theorem 5.4). When X(t) is larger,
we will use the stronger bounds in Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 instead.
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As a result, the recurrence as a whole can be summarized below:
When X(t) > 0, adversarial leaders will be able to directly increase their ability to affect
which chain is used by honest leaders, expressed by the reduction of X(t) by 1, as well as
increase the potential advantage they can gain if they are able to get the honest parties
to switch chain, expressed by the reduction of Y (t) by 1. Honest leaders can do much the
opposite. More rounds led by honest leaders means the adversary must win an equal number
of rounds in order to catch up, represented by X(t) increasing away from 0, and an honest
win similarly reduces the power of any existing hidden chains since the hidden chains are
comparatively shorter. This is represented by the increase in Y (t).
When X(t) ≤ 0, the previous are still both true, but because the adversary is able to freely
change the longest public chain which is being used by the honest parties, it is impossible
to know whether a given hidden chain is convergent or divergent to the public one. As a
result, while honest leaders increase both quantities, and adversarial leaders decrease both
quantities, the recurrence assumes that X(t) and Y (t) are interchangeable while X(t) ≤ 0.
To reiterate, the recurrence is as follows:
If X(t) ≥ 1:
Lt = H : X(t + 1) ≥ X(t) + 1, Y (t + 1) ≥ min(0, Y (t) + 1), (5.8)
Lt = A : X(t + 1) ≥ X(t)− 1, Y (t + 1) ≥ Y (t)− 1, (5.9)
If X(t) ≤ 0:
Lt = H : X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1), Y (t + 1) ≥ min(0, X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1),
(5.10)
Lt = A : X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t)− 1, Y (t)− 1), Y (t + 1) ≥ min(X(t)− 1, Y (t)− 1),
(5.11)
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CHAPTER 6: THE PROTOCOL AS A RANDOM WALK
During the runtime of any protocol that runs similarly to the one described in Chapter 4,
we can show that these lower bounds always hold for any adversarial strategy. As a result,
we can clearly see that we can model the worst-case scenario for X(t) and Y (t) based on the
number of rounds passed t. We will show in the following section that this model manifests
as a two-dimensional random walk where the system is vulnerable to double-spend attacks
at a commit length of t only in scenarios in which X(t) ≤ 0.
6.1 RANDOM WALK MODEL
It should be fairly clear to see that the system is at risk if and only if X(t) ≤ 0. This is
because in the case where X(t) ≤ 0, we have directly that there exists an alternative chain
which is hidden by the adversary that is at least of length equal to the longest chain known
by honest parties. Therefore, if the genesis block on tree u had already been committed, the
adversary need only release this alternative chain with genesis block on tree k to all honest
parties to push the u-tree genesis block off of the ledger. Similarly, if X(t) > 0, then this
alternative chain cannot exist, and the adversary is unable to challenge the longest public
chain in round t.
In the worst case, a random walk following each of our lower bounds will occur.
When X(t) > 0, theorem 5.1 states that if an honest leader is selected by the oracle, both
X(t) and Y (t) will proceed in the positive direction, provided Y (t) < 0. Similarly, theorem
5.2. states that if a malicious leader is selected, both X(t) and Y (t) will proceed in the
negative direction. This will mean that the random walk will proceed linearly until X(t)
becomes 0.
When X(t) reaches 0, we will instead be forced to used the looser bounds present in
theorem 5.3 and theorem 5.4. This will inevitably result in an immediate one-time loss in
X(t) to match the accumulated negative Y (t). However, once this loss in X(t) occurs, we will
again see the random walk proceed linearly, as X(t) must reach 0 if a negative accumulation
of Y (t) < X(t) is to occur again.
The walk on both negative and positive sides of the x-axis is predictable, such that the
linear progression of X(t) on the positive side of X(t) = 0 models identically to the random
walk present in Bitcoin PoW, and the walk on the negative side progresses linearly towards
X(t) = 0.
For X(t) > 0, the probability that the adversary can reach X(t) = 0 is weighted heavily
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fasdfasdHonest Leaders increase X(t)
Adversary must match 
Honest buffer to reach 0
If a competing chain can be 
built, a negative jump in X(t) 
can occur
The walk continues linearly 
until X(t) reaches 0
Figure 6.1: The walk will proceed in a linear fashion until X(t) ≤ 0, where it may drop a
large, but expected amount.
against it. That is, at X(t) = z, the probability that it will become non-positive is as follows:
p = probability an honest leader is selected (6.1)
q = probability an adversarial leader is selected (6.2)
qz = probability that an adversary will catch up from a deficit of z blocks (6.3)
qz =
{
1, if p ≤ q
(q/p)z, if p > q
}
(6.4)
However, unique to our analysis is the idea that if the adversary is able to win this game
for some z, they can immediately set X(t) to −z. This is because in order to reach X(t) = 0
from the positive direction, the adversary must have led z more blocks than honest leaders
in rounds after X(t) reached z. As such, from a starting point of Y (t) = 0, the adversary
will also have the opportunity to build negative potential advantage Y (t) = −z during these
rounds.
A Simulation of the Random Walk Unfortunately, due to the added complications
of our 2D random walk, we are unable to easily model the probability that an adversary
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Figure 6.2: In similar fashion to PoW chains, the probability of breaking security drops
exponentially as time passes. With an honest leader selection probability of 0.6, after 235
steps, a double-spend attack is impossible except for 0.001 probability.
can maintain a negative advantage through Markov chain analysis, or any other simple
probabilistic model. While this is the case, we are still able to provide probabilities of
successful attacks by directly calculating the distributions after a number of rounds have
passed as a function of the probability that an honest leader is selected. We have the
resulting X(t + 1) and Y (t + 1) as a function of an honest/adversary leader selection and
X(t) and Y (t). So, to find the probability of acquiring some X(t + 1) and Y (t + 1), we
only need to track the probability of the pairs X(t) and Y (t) and the leader selection which
would result in those values.
Summing the distribution for probabilities that X(t) ≤ 0 will then provide us the prob-
ability that the adversary is capable of developing an alternate chain at the number of
steps which have passed. An example of this sum over an increasing number of steps with















Table 6.1: The number of steps needed to ensure a double spend happens with p < 0.001
probability is much larger for PoS, as expected.
Additional Observations on Worst-Case Random Walk Despite decreasing expo-
nentially with the number of blocks that are proposed, our worst-case probabilities for Proof
of Stake protocols perform much worse than that of a Proof of Work protocol by a consid-
erable amount. This is expected due to the additional options open to the Proof of Stake
adversary, and confirms the results of analysis on other PoS protocols [3].
In particular, to prevent an attack at a given confidence level, our PoS protocol must wait
around double the amount of rounds, increasing to triple and higher as the amount of stake
controlled by the adversary increases.
A full comparison between the number of steps needed to achieve p < 0.001 in Bitcoin
PoW and this PoS protocol can be seen in table 6.1.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCURRENT LEADERS IN A POS PROTOCOL
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a number of elements in the protocol which are
abstractions of their real-world implementations. In this section, we will show that our
protocol can account for leader selection process which allow for concurrent leaders. While we
previously assumed an ideal leader selection oracle which chooses a single leader, concurrent
leaders can also be supported with very few changes to the protocol. We will also show that
this altered PoS protocol can continue to express the random walk as described in Chapter
6.
A More Practical Leader Selection Oracle While there are a number of implemen-
tation methods which may allow a number of parties to reach consensus regarding the
result of a random coin, the most popular in current PoS protocols are Verifiable Random
Functions(VRFs) due to their relatively low communication cost [6][5]. In these types of
implementation, each party calculates for themselves whether they have been selected as a
leader in the next round, and if so, they are able to create a verification that this is the case
under their public key. In the context of our protocol, this would mean that other parties
could easily check this verification in order to determine whether proposed blocks are valid
for their respective rounds.
However, VRFs are different from our oracle in that because each party will run a pseu-
dorandom check to determine whether they have been selected to lead a timeslot, there is
the possibility that multiple parties will be able to provide proof that they are a leader of
the round. As such, it is important for our analysis to additionally cover the possibility of
selecting multiple leaders in a single timeslot. Note that while the analysis below supports
VRFs, it is also general enough to support any method of leader selection that might result
in multiple parties sharing leadership over a round.
Relevant Cases for Concurrent Leaders It should first be noted that the presence of
a single adversarial leader is the same as the presence of any number of adversarial leaders.
As the adversary is allowed to perform any number of block extensions on any number of
chains, the adversary gains no additional strategies with further wins within a single round.
It should additionally be noted that in the presence of an adversarial leader, additional
honest leaders past the first also have no effect on the recurrence, as at worst, the adversary
will be able to convince a second honest leader to act as an adversarial leader, and as
previous, multiple adversarial leaders provide no strategical benefit to the adversary.
As a result, we identify four cases which are unique from our previous single-leader analysis.
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The case in which there is at least one adversarial leader and at least one honest leader, which
we will denote as Lt = H
∗, A∗ for both X(t) > 0 and X(t) ≤ 0, as well as the case in which
there is any number of honest leaders with no adversarial presence, denoted as Lt = H
∗ for
both X(t) > 0 and X(t) ≤ 0. Any number of adversaries such that Lt = A∗ will act the
same as their single-leader counterpart Lt = A, but we will list them for completeness.
In the presence of an adversarial leader, regardless of the value of X(t), the presence of
an honest leader will strictly benefit honest advantage during the timeslot. This can be seen
in a case-by-case analysis.
Theorem 7.1. If Lt = H
∗, A∗ and X(t) ≥ 1, then X(t + 1) ≥ X(t) and Y (t + 1) ≥ Y (t).
Proof. If the current X(t) ≥ 1, the honest leader(s) will extend one of the convergent chains
in P∗(t), extending the length of any pi(t) by one. Otherwise, the malicious party is not
restricted in how it may act, and has the same options as if a malicious leader was selected on
its own. As a result, any gj(t) may be increased in length by one, regardless of convergence
to chains in P∗(t). Recalling that X(t + 1) and Y (t + 1) are defined as
X(t + 1) = min
i∈I(t+1),j∈J(t+1),i 6=j
pi(t + 1)− gj(t + 1),
Y (t + 1) = min
i∈I(t+1)
pi(t + 1)− gi(t + 1)
We can see that the first term of both quantities must increase by at least one, and the
second terms may each increase by at most one. As a result, X(t+1) ≥ X(t) and Y (t+1) ≥
Y (t). This is strictly greater than the bounds defined in theorem 5.2, X(t + 1) ≥ X(t)− 1
and Y (t + 1) ≥ Y (t)− 1 QED.
Theorem 7.2. If Lt = H
∗, A∗, then X(t+1) ≥ min(X(t), Y (t)) and Y (t+1) ≥ min(X(t), Y (t)).
Proof. In any other scenario, having an honest leader will continue to force the length of
any chain in P∗(t + 1) to be at least greater in length than any chain in P∗(t). The chain
will otherwise continue as described in theorem 5.4. We may once again choose our subtrees
u′, v′ and k′ such that X(t + 1) and Y (t + 1) are minimized, regardless of their convergence
in timeslot t. Additionally, the malicious leader may extend any hidden chain by at most 1,
such that gk′(t + 1) is at most one longer than any chain in timeslot t. Borrowing from our
previous notation, we can describe X(t + 1) as
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X(t + 1) = pu′(t + 1)− gk′(t + 1)
X(t + 1) = pu(t) + 1−max(gu(t) + 1, gv(t) + 1)
X(t + 1) = min(X(t), Y (t))
Similarly, Y (t + 1) follows similarly to theorem 5.4 as well. gv′(t + 1) may increase by at
most one, such that
Y (t + 1) = pv′(t + 1)− gv′(t + 1)
Y (t + 1) = pv(t) + 1−max(gu(t) + 1, gv(t) + 1, pu(t) + 1)
Y (t + 1) = min(X(t), Y (t))
QED.
Again, this is strictly greater than the bounds set in theorem 5.4. Qualitatively, it can be
seen that in the case of conflicting multiple leader selection, advantage will neither decrease
nor increase on the chain. We can therefore safely consider rounds in which any malicious
leader is selected as if they were controlled by a single malicious leader, as our lower bounds
will remain present in these cases.
However, if multiple honest leaders are selected and X(t) is non-positive, we are unable
to directly use the bounds set in theorem 5.3. As honest leaders may choose to extend
conflicting chains, there is the potential that their efforts to increase X(t) cancel out for the
round. This is not possible if X(t) > 0, as there will not be a conflicting chain which the
honest leaders can extend. This is described more formally in theorems 7.3 and 7.4.
Theorem 7.3. If Lt = H
∗ and X(t) ≥ 1, then X(t + 1) ≥ X(t) + 1 and Y (t + 1) ≥
min(Y (t) + 1, 0).
Proof. If X(t) ≥ 1, the actions of all honest leaders are identical. As we can recall from
lemma 5.2, we have that all chains in P∗(t) exist on a single subtree. As a result, the block
extension of all honest leaders in timeslot t+ 1 will involve the same subtree, and any chain
in P∗(t+ 1) will also be on this subtree. Additionally, without malicious leaders, no further
chains will be released into G(t + 1)
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Then X(t) will be determined as follows.
X(t + 1) = pu′(t + 1)− gk′(t + 1)
X(t + 1) = pu(t) + 1− gk(t)
X(t + 1) = X(t) + 1
Similarly, Y (t) is as below:
Y (t + 1) = pv′(t + 1)− gv′(t + 1)
Y (t + 1) = pv(t) + 1−max(gu(t), pu(t) + 1)
Y (t + 1) = min(Y (t) + 1, 0)
QED.
This is identical to bounds described in theorem 5.1.
Theorem 7.4. If Lt = H
∗, then X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1, 0) and Y (t + 1) ≥
min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1, 0).
Proof. Since it is possible for multiple chains to be contained within P∗(t), honest leaders
may release extended blocks into P∗(t + 1) which lie on different subtrees. Since this is the
case, G(t + 1) 6≈u may in the worst case contain G(t) and any chains released into P∗(t + 1).
As a result, the following is true about X(t + 1)
X(t + 1) = pu′(t + 1)− gk′(t + 1)
X(t + 1) = pu(t) + 1−max(gu(t), gv(t), pu(t) + 1)
X(t + 1) = min(X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1, 0)
Y (t + 1) is unchanged from theorem 5.3, as the recurrence for Y (t + 1) already accounts
for chains released into P∗(t + 1). QED.
It can be seen that this will only benefit the adversary in a meaningful way if both X(t)
and Y (t) are already 0, which should happen rarely. Additionally, while we’ve reused the
bounds from Chapter 5, in reality, these bounds are quite loose with concurrent leaders, as
we allow the adversary to win rounds where they are involved at all, where in reality, it is
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fasdfasdHonest Leaders increase X(t)
Adversary must match 
Honest buffer to reach 0
If a competing chain can be 
built, a negative jump in X(t) 
can occur
The walk continues linearly 
until X(t) reaches 0
Only a single honest 
leader can increase 
to X(t) = 1
Figure 7.1: The walk can use identical bounds, where rounds with any malicious leader are
given to the adversary. However, the X(t) = 0 case requires only one leader is selected to
move to X(t) = 1
more akin to a tie. Given the extreme rarity of both multiple leaders and an X(t) = 0 case,
this concurrent leaders case will not have meaningful negative effects on the random walk
as a whole.
With multiple concurrent leaders, in addition to previous rules for single leader selection,
the recurrence will be as follows:
If X(t) ≥ 1:
Lt = H
∗ : X(t + 1) ≥ X(t) + 1, Y (t + 1) ≥ min(0, Y (t) + 1), (7.1)
Lt = H
∗, A∗ : X(t + 1) ≥ X(t), Y (t + 1) ≥ Y (t), (7.2)
Lt = A
∗ : X(t + 1) ≥ X(t)− 1, Y (t + 1) ≥ Y (t)− 1 (7.3)
If X(t) ≤ 0:
Lt = H
∗ : X(t + 1) ≥ min(0, X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1), Y (t + 1) ≥ min(0, X(t) + 1, Y (t) + 1),
(7.4)
Lt = H
∗, A∗ : X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t), Y (t)), Y (t + 1) ≥ min(X(t), Y (t)), (7.5)
Lt = A
∗ : X(t + 1) ≥ min(X(t)− 1, Y (t)− 1), Y (t + 1) ≥ min(X(t)− 1, Y (t)− 1) (7.6)
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In the previous sections, we propose a new metric for tracking the security of Proof of Stake
chains directly, and claim it accurately captures the security of an example PoS protocol
simulation. In this section, we discuss some possible applications of a new metric, as well as
some elements of our analysis that would benefit from further exploration.
8.1 NON-STATIC STARTING ADVANTAGES
It should be noted that due to the complexity of working with the 2D random walk, we
have not provided a full analysis of our metric. Most importantly, while we have provided
the capabilities to reach consensus on height-0 through our protocol, for any reasonable
implementation of Proof of Stake as a currency, it will become necessary to encode additional
transaction data in blocks of arbitrary height, which should then be able to be committed,
and are therefore vulnerable to double-spend.
This is a non-trivial case, as games that start on a different height start with non-zero
values of X(t) and Y (t). Once known, the distribution will follow cleanly from the random
walk as usual. However, the starting distributions of X(t) and Y (t) being unknown prevents
us from easily calculating safety in much later rounds. These starting distributions will be
in the adversary’s favor, as if they are not, the adversary may simply fork a new chain from
the longest public chain.
The starting negative distributions of X(t) and Y (t) should remain small, due to how
the random walk is structured. While we have defined the random walk for comparing the
distribution of X(t) and Y (t) for the height 0 block, the walk functionally does not change
for an arbitrary height h. That is, although the starting distribution may change, a walk
that starts at height h will still be subject to the exponential decline in the probability that
an adversary can create a successful attack. Additionally, starting distributions for different
heights are still subject to the linear random walk which dictates our negative X(t) values.
Since this walk skews towards zero, the distributions should also skew towards zero to some
degree.
The main issue in finding these distributions is that we can only find the starting distribu-
tions with respect to the round number t, whereas we would like the starting distributions
with respect to the block height h. In order to simplify discussion, we stated that chains
must be divergent at h if they have not yet built a block at height h. This nuance of
convergence is not relevant to the genesis case, but may act strangely in arbitrary height
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games. If a chain shorter than height h reaches it during the height-h game, its effects are
not immediately apparent. As part of the analysis, it would also be necessary to choose
when the height h game begins. This choice is also not obvious, and therefore it is difficult
to determine starting values of X and Y . We leave the expansion of this analysis to future
work.
8.2 MORE REALISTIC PROTOCOLS
We have purposefully chosen an ideal version of PoS to show the viability of our metric.
While Chapter 7 is one step which can make the protocol more realistic, the protocol after
these changes still lacks some details which would be relevant in a real-world setting.
Dynamic Availability In our protocol, we assume that any party which is unable to
participate fully at every round, especially in the leader role of block extension, is considered
as part of the adversary. We frame our analysis in this way for the sake of simplicity, but a
more realistic analysis might allow for some portion of honest leaders to be inactive, but not
malicious during rounds of the game. This dynamic availability case, with a third class of
parties, would require some significant modifications to our protocol as listed, we will leave
the analysis of dynamic availability to future work.
Removal of Fixed-Stake In a realistic setting, currency would be exchanged throughout
the lifetime of the protocol, such that the assumption of Fixed-Stake listed in Chapter 4
would no longer hold. Allowing users to exchange stake would require additional interaction
with the protocol, and is left as a future direction.
Partial Synchrony We also assume synchrony as a requirement of our protocol. Real-
world implementations of PoS may seek to perform under less strict network requirements.
While not a focus of this paper, this analysis is non-trivial and merits further discussion.
Mining Rewards and Attack Analysis The continued upkeep of PoW chains is typi-
cally supported by participants who build the chain for some tangible reward. This “mining
reward” can also be implemented in PoS chains, such that block extension is beneficial to
leaders in a direct manner. This reward structure is not present in our protocol, and its
inclusion and subsequent analysis may be an interesting direction for future work.
Block extension rewards are especially relevant in Proof of Stake, as hypothetically, it
creates incentive for even otherwise honest parties to extend any chain which comes into
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view in order to ensure they will acquire rewards even if an attack is successful. This
is widely referred to as the “Nothing-at-Stake” attack. Analyzing nothing-at-stake would
require some understanding of the motivations of the honest parties, which we will not
provide in this paper.
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